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The transition to market-oriented economies in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in 
the 1990s, like the Great Depression in the U.S. and Germany in the 1930s, generated sharp declines in real 
incomes and a corresponding drop in fertility. This is contrary to the robust negative relationship between 
income and fertility that has been extensively documented. This paper presents a theoretical model that 
explains the positive relationship between fertility and income. The model predicts that: i) the perceived 
level of subsistence consumption fundamentally determines whether fertility and income are positively or 
negatively related; ii) once incomes decline below a threshold, declining labor income causes fertility to 
fall; and iii) rising income inequality has a negative impact on fertility rates. Empirical tests using both 
aggregate and microeconomic data provide strong support for the predictions of the model. Our empirics 
predict that the perceived subsistence level is a statistically significant determinant of fertility and that the 
average country in our sample will remain in a Mathusian fertility regime for twenty more years.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The link between birth rates and economic conditions has intrigued economists 
since the beginning of systematic economic analysis. Malthus contended that fertility 
would rise as incomes increase and vice versa, influencing the predictions of nineteenth-
century economists. Counter to Malthus’ prediction, during the past 150 years fertility 
generally fell rather than rose as incomes grew. Empirical evidence on the inverse 
relationship between fertility and income per capita has been extensively documented in 
the literature (e.g., Tamura, 1988; Barro, 1991; Feng, Kugler & Zak, 2000). Much of the 
recent literature on fertility and economic growth has modeled the transition from the 
“Malthusian” stage where there is a positive relationship between income and population 
growth, to the “modern” stage characterized by an inverse relationship between income 
and fertility (e.g., Becker et al., 1990; Kremer, 1993; Galor & Weil, 1996; Dahan & 
Tsiddon, 1998). 
  In the wake of the collapse of the communist block, Malthusian fertility has 
reemerged in Eastern and Central Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. 
Indeed, the transition by communist countries to market-oriented economies in the 1990s, 
like the Great Depression in the U.S. and Germany in the 1930s, generated sharp declines 
in real incomes and corresponding drops in fertility rates. This paper reconciles the 
existing models of fertility with the positive relationship between income and fertility 
observed in the former communist countries. It does this by analyzing the impact of 
individuals’ perceived subsistence level of consumption on economic and fertility 
choices. In addition to an explanation for the dramatic fall in fertility following the   MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 3 
 
transition, this paper sheds new light on the mechanisms linking income inequality and 
fertility.  
  Some scholars have suggested that the fall in fertility in transition countries is 
unrelated to the economic factors. According to these views, all or most of the recent 
decrease in fertility is the result of a shift toward Western-style reproductive behaviors 
(Conrad, et al., 1996), attitudes toward family and work (Maxwell, 1998), or the removal 
of pronatalist politics of the 1980s (Zakharov & Ivanova, 1996).  However, these 
explanations have little support in the data, as shown by the more rapid than average 
decline in fertility rates among older women especially in the former Soviet Union, by 
the frequent increases in the share of first births in total births, and by the results of recent 
surveys on factors influencing women’s childbearing decisions. For instance, in a 1999 
survey in Russia, 97 percent of the women interviewed cited a lack of money as a major 
barrier to having another child, 15 percent said inadequate housing was the main cause, 
while 8 percent cited the confidence in regaining their jobs after childbirth (The New York 
Times, 2000).
1  
  This paper presents an equilibrium model in which individuals consume, save and 
make fertility choices, in the tradition of Becker (1960), Razin & Ben-Zion (1975), and 
Becker & Barro (1988). To derive nonergodic behavior from an otherwise standard 
intertemporal fertility model, a subsistence level of consumption is introduced. The 
model is thus related to the work by Azariadis (1996) and Jones (2000). This paper, 
however, extends these studies in three primary ways. First, we derive rather than assume 
a structural break that produces a demographic transition, i.e., a threshold below which 
                                                 
1 For additional surveys with similar findings, see Haub (1994). 
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fertility declines as incomes fall. Second, we characterize the relationship between 
fertility and the distribution of income taking into account subsistence consumption.  We 
show that this produces a nonmonotone relationship between inequality and fertility.   
And third, we subject the model’s implications to a battery of empirical tests which we 
show support the model’s predictions.   
  Indeed, the model has three primary testable predictions: i) the perceived level of 
subsistence consumption fundamentally determines whether fertility and income are 
positively or negatively related; ii) once incomes decline below an identified threshold, 
declining labor income causes fertility to fall; and iii) rising income inequality has a 
negative impact on fertility rates. These results are quite intuitive. If incomes fall 
sufficiently relative to subsistence levels of consumption, children become less affordable 
and aggregate births decrease.
2 Furthermore, higher income variance associated with 
increased downward income mobility makes meeting subsistence consumption less 
likely, resulting in a decreased willingness to have children. Thus, though changes in 
income inequality have long been recognized as important correlates of economic 
growth, this paper explores an unexamined relationship between income inequality and 
fertility choices in times of economic depression.
3  
  The model's predictions are tested in two ways.  The first uses aggregate cross-
section time-series data from 1979 to 1999 for 23 transition countries. The data set 
includes six regions (Central Europe, the Balkans, the Baltic states, the Slavic states of 
the former Soviet Union, the Transcaucasian states, and Central Asia) that display 
                                                 
2 Jones (2000) calls this the subsistence effect. 
3 For a thorough discussion of the relationship between income inequality and economic growth, see Galor 
& Zeira (1993), McGregor (1995), Perotti (1996), Owen & Weil (1997), Barro (2000). 
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considerable variation, thus reducing the risk of spurious results or weak inferences. The 
second empirical test of the model utilizes microeconomic data from the Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. One of the empirical contributions of the paper is the 
estimation of the income threshold that determines whether fertility and income are 
positively or negatively related. This threshold is fundamentally determined by the 
perceived subsistence level of consumption that, interestingly, shows evidence of 
changing over time (Milanovic & Jovanovic, 1999).    
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
remarkable decline in birth rates and real incomes in the former communist countries 
during the period of transition. In Section 3, we present an overlapping generations model 
with endogenous fertility. Section 4 derives implications from the model, while Section 5 




2 THE POST-COMMUNIST “GREAT DEPRESSION” AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC 
RESPONSE 
 
Although experiences varied from country to country, the transition from 
communism generally featured a sharp fall in real incomes, associated in many countries 
with a rise in unemployment and inflation. In a number of countries these developments 
caused widespread poverty and disintegration of the comprehensive social programs 
developed by the former regimes. It is therefore not surprising that the transition has   MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 6 
 
profoundly affected, in many different ways, the lives and behavior of the hundreds of 
millions of people. One of the ways people reacted to the palpable worsening of material 
circumstances was reflected in a precipitous drop in fertility rates.  
 
  Table 1.  Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and Crude Birth Rate (CBR) 
TFR  CBR  % change in   
   Country  1989/90 1997/8 1989/90 1997/8  TFR  CBR 
Central Europe 
   Czech Republic 
   Hungary 
   Poland 
   Slovak Republic 
   Slovenia 
Balkans 
   Albania 
   Bosnia-Herzegovina 
   Bulgaria 
   Croatia 
   Macedonia 
   Romania 
   Yugoslavia 
Baltic states 
   Estonia 
   Latvia 
   Lithuania 
Slavic states and Moldova 
   Belarus 
   Moldova 
   The Russian Federation 
   Ukraine 
Transcaucasian states 
   Armenia 
   Azerbaijan 
   Georgia 
Central Asia 
   Kazakhstan 
   Kyrgyz Republic 
   Tajikistan 
   Turkmenistan 
   Uzbekistan 
All transition countries 



















































































































































































































Source: World Development Indicators 2000. 
 
Table 1 illustrates the change in fertility for 27 transition countries since the 
beginning of the transition. The total fertility rate (the number of births per woman) and   MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 7 
 
crude birth rate (the number of births per 1,000 people) both decreased sharply in every 
country. The average crude birth rate declined from 19.05 to 12.36, a drop of 
approximately 35 percent. Central Europe and the Balkans have registered relatively 
smaller declines in fertility; their crude birth rates decreased, on average, by 28 and 24 
percent, respectively. The decline was greater in Central Asia, even greater in the Slavic 
states, Moldova and the Baltics, and the greatest in the Transcaucasian states (a 46 
percent decline). The dispersion of fertility rates among transition economies also 
declined, indicating decreased differences among countries. 
The contrast with European Union (EU) countries, where the crude birth rate fell 
by 10 percent during the same period, puts the fertility decline within a broader European 
context. As Table 1 shows, the fertility decline in the transition countries was three to 
four times as large as the decline recorded in the EU countries during the same period. A 
fortiori, the largest reductions in fertility rates among EU countries recorded in the 1970s 
and 1980s is unmatched by the deep fertility declines for the transition countries during 
the 1990s.
4 Before the fall of communism, average fertility in every regional grouping of 
countries in Table 1 exceeded the EU average, while a decade later fertility in every 
group except the Central Asian republics (which have had traditionally high fertility 
rates) was approximately the same level or lower than the EU average. In particular, 
before the transition the vast majority of the transition countries had fertility rates of 
around two children per woman. Among the EU countries in 1989, only two countries – 
Ireland and Sweden – had total fertility rates higher than two, with the lowest rates 
observed at that time in Italy and Spain of less than 1.4. In 1997/98, all the transition 
                                                 
4 For an extensive discussion of fertility declines in transition countries as compared to those in the EU in 
the 1970s and 1980s, see Macura (1996).   MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 8 
 
countries – with the exception of the Central Asian countries, Azerbaijan and Albania – 
had total fertility rates below two, with most countries well below two. 
The depth of the post-communist depression is further illustrated by comparing it 
to the 1929-33 Great Depression. Figure 1 shows real GDP for Russia and Hungary 
during 1989-97, using 1989 as a base year, and real GDP for the United States and 
Germany during 1929-37, using 1929 as a base year. The decline in output was initially 
steeper in Hungary, Germany, and the U.S. than in Russia. Yet, while the first three 
countries experienced a large initial drop in output and then began to grow after three to 
four years, Russia has experienced a continuing deep depression. Russian GDP fell 
monotonically throughout the sample period, and in 1997 was 42 percent below its 1989 
level. The depression in Hungary, though deeper than that in Russia during the first two 
years, was not as severe or long-lived. The Hungarian trough, reached in 1993, was 
approximately 18 percent below the 1989 level. Since 1993, Hungary has grown 
consistently and, by 1997 Hungarian GDP was only 9 percent below its 1989 level.  
  The behavioral patterns of fertility during the Great Depression and the post-
communist transition are also analogs. As shown in Figure 2, each of the four countries 
experienced a decline in fertility rates following economic deterioration. Germany and 
the United States reached their lowest fertility rates in 1933. Births increased rapidly in 
1934 in Germany, with fertility in that year exceeding its initial 1929 level. In the U.S., 
fertility started increasing in 1934 and slowly approached its 1929 level during the 1930s. 
Out of the four countries, Russia experienced the most severe fertility reduction, 
mirroring the decline in its GDP. In 1997 the fertility rate in Russia was 41 percent below 
its base level.    MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 9 
 
























Note: 1929 = 100 for the U.S. and Germany; 1989 = 100 for Russia and Hungary. 
Source: For the U.S. and Germany: Liesner (1989, Table US.2 and Table G.2). For Russia and Hungary: 
World Development Indicators, GDP at market prices (constant 1995 US$). 
 
Figure 2.  Fertility Rate in the USA and Germany (1929-37); and in 





























 Note: 1929 = 100 for the USA and Germany; 1989 = 100 for Russia and Hungary. 
Source: For the USA: Statistical Abstract of the United States (1944-45). For Germany: Mitchell (1992). 
For Russia and Hungary: World Development Indicators, Fertility rate, crude (per 1,000 people). 
 
While the data may be subject to measurement error, the figures clearly illustrate 
that massive income declines produce a different effect on fertility than do gradual   MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 10 
 
income variations. Unfavorable shocks seemingly jar an economy into a Malthusian state 
where fertility declines follow drops in income. The key assumption in the model 
developed in the next section is that there is a switch in domination between the 
substitution and income effects of a change in income on fertility depending on the level 
of income. Specifically, the substitution effect (child-rearing requires time away from 
work) normally dominates the income effect (children are more affordable) à la Becker  
(1991). However, if income falls sufficiently relative to the subsistence level of 
consumption, the income effect dominates the substitution effect and the willingness to 
have children falls. This is shown in the indifference map in Figure 3 where households 
become less willing to trade consumption for children as they become poorer within a 
critical range.
5 In particular, when income is sufficiently low relative to the subsistence 
level of consumption, a household with utility level U is less willing to give up 
consumption in order to increase births from b1 to b2 than is the wealthier household at 
utility U’’. 
 
Figure 3.  Indifference map near subsistence consumption 
 
          b 
 
     
 
            b2 
             
            b1 
 
              U          U’              U’’ 
           c 
 
  Note: b is births, c is consumption. 
                                                 
5 For a formal derivation of this critical range, see equation (5).   MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 11 
 
  Both the Great Depression and the transition of the former communist countries 
featured an increased proportion of those living in poverty, including those that were 
traditionally situated in the middle class. For example, Milanovic & Jovanovic (1999) 
show that in Russia between 1993-96 the percentage of the population who (subjectively) 
considered themselves poor was extremely high, 60-90 percent, and varied over time. 
Even according to the “objective” criterion of the official poverty line, the proportion of 
the poor increased from 25-60 percent during the same period. Because of the 
impoverishment of the middle class, income inequality rose sharply post transition.
6 
Therefore, the analysis that follows characterizes the effects of changes in both the level 
and distribution of income on fertility. 
 
 
3  THE MODEL 
 
Agents in this model live three periods in overlapping generations, and are     
heterogeneous in their human capital and in the perceived level of subsistence 
consumption.  The first period of an agent’s life is childhood, the second is young 
adulthood, and the third is old age. By assumption, parents choose their children’s 
consumption, and therefore children do not receive utility from consuming goods. In the 
second period of life, agents supply labor inelastically to firms, choose family size, and 
save for old age. Reproduction is limited to the second period of life and, for simplicity, 
                                                 
6 For empirical evidence of increased income inequality during the post-communist transition, see Kakwani 
(1996) and Milanovic (1998).    MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 12 
 
children are produced by parthenogenesis (asexual reproduction).
7 We also abstract from 
the spacing of children by assuming that parents have all of their children at the 
beginning of adulthood. In old age, agents are retired and consume from the principal and 
interest on their savings. Agents die at the end of the third period of their lives.  
 
3.1 THE CONSUMER’S PROBLEM 
 
It is convenient to specify the model in units per effective worker so that human 
capital enters the model in a tractable way. Let us identify an agent by the superscript i ∈  
+ ℜ .  Young adults use current labor income wh
i (the economy-wide average wage w 
times type i’s human capital h
i) to fund consumption 
i c1, to raise children at cost e
i per 
child, and to save a
i for old age. Define 
i c2 as old-age consumption which is financed by  
the principal and interest on savings, Ra
i, where R ≡  1 + r – δ  is one plus the net interest 
rate (r – δ ), with δ  ∈  [0,1] the depreciation rate on physical capital.  Preferences are 
defined over youthful consumption 
i c1, old-age consumption 




When utility is logarithmic, the lifetime utility maximization problem for agent i 
born at time t - 1 is 
 
                                                 
7 Parthenogenesis simplifies the intergenerational transmissions of human capital and allows us to avoid the 
issue of marriage matching; on marriage matching, see Zak & Park (in press) and Burdett & Coles (1997). 
8 Note that the model does not assume that parents are altruistic toward their children. The incorporation of 
altruism would complicate but not substantially change the analysis (see Zak, 2000). 
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where  β  ∈  (0,1) is the patience parameter, γ  > 0 is the weight on the preference for 




t x x 1 , 2 , 1 , +  are the perceived subsistence consumption levels for young and 
old adults. The budget constraints in (1) relate to the two periods of adulthood.
9 Lastly, b  
> 0 is the minimum number of children in each family.
10 
The rearing of children is a time intensive activity (Birdsall, 1988). Rather than 
include a “time spent with children” choice for parents, we simplify the model by 
assuming that higher wages induce a substitution effect away from fertility by raising the 
cost of children nonlinearly, though with an upper bound. As a result, the cost of children 
is parameterized as a convex function of labor income,  
 
                                                 
9 Perceived levels of subsistence consumption are primarily affected by an individual’s past consumption 
and by comparison with the consumption of others. The factors that influence the formation of perceived 
subsistence levels are outside the scope of this paper. For a discussion of comparison utility in an 
endogenous growth model, see Carroll, Overland & Weil (1997). 
10 The constraint that  0 > ≥ b b
i
t  is necessary for well-defined asymptotic behavior of the system but is not 
crucial to the analysis. 
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t , 1 1 , 2 , 1 2 ∀ + ≡ + + . The 
parameter ρ  > 1 is the constant elasticity of the cost of children with respect to the labor 
income.
11 
Setting aside integer constraints associated with the choice of family size and 
ignoring altogether complications like infant mortality, twins, and the like, the optimal 
choices made by a type i agent at time t for savings and the number of children are 
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t t R x x h w .  
Optimal savings, (3), is increasing in income, decreasing in the preference for 
children parameter, γ , and increasing in the patience parameter, β . As expected, optimal 
savings is negatively related to current perceived subsistence consumption, 
i
t x , 1 , and 
                                                 
11 The bifurcated cost of children parameterization is the result of the lower bound on fertility, b , and is 
designed so that the model’s equilibrium conditions are continuous at bt =b . The critical value of labor 
income,  κ , where the cost of children increases linearly in labor income is implicitly defined by 




t t , 2 1 1 ∀ = −
ρ . It is straightforward to show that for any ρ  > 1 there is 
i
t th w  > 0 for 
which κ  is unique. 
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positively related to the discounted value of future perceived subsistence consumption, 
1 1 , 2 / + + t
i
t R x . The optimal number of children (4), which will be the focus of the analysis in 
the following sections, increases as the preference for children rises and falls as the 
perceived subsistence consumption levels increase.
12   
      
 
5  IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL 
 
Lemma 1 defines the threshold for a positive relationship between fertility and 
income. 
 
Lemma 1.  The optimal number of children is increasing in labor income if 
 











t t R x x h w h w
ρ
ρ
     (5) 
 
This lemma demonstrates that if labor income declines sufficiently relative to the 
current and discounted future subsistence levels of consumption, children become less 
affordable and fertility decreases. To wit, when income drops sufficiently, the income 
effect on fertility dominates the substitution effect, reducing the birth rates.  
Note that since ρ  > 1, the Malthusian threshold 
i
t t h w  is above the sum of the 
perceived subsistence consumption levels. As expected, the threshold 
i
t t h w  is positively 
                                                 
12 Appendix A.1 specifies the equilibrium conditions for this model.   MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 16 
 
related to the perceived levels of subsistence consumption. In addition, the threshold is 
declining in the elasticity of the cost of children with respect to labor income, ρ .
13 For 
example, in countries with pro-natalist policies ρ  might be lower and thus the Malthusian 
threshold, 
i
t t h w , higher. In this case, a smaller decline in income would induce a fertility 
reduction. One characteristic of the former communist countries was a generally pro-
children stance as reflected in relatively cheap facilities for childcare, universal health 
care and education, and a heavy emphasis on family allowances.
14  This suggests that the 
cost-of-children elasticity ρ  was relatively low, resulting in a high Mathusian threshold 
i
t t h w . Accordingly, with a high ρ  at the outset of the transition, even moderate declines 
in incomes would have been sufficient to generate reductions in fertility.  
    The optimal number of children, as given by equation (4), is a continuous 
function of labor income. Lemma 1 shows that births increase in labor income at low 
levels of income (below 
i wh ).  It is straightforward to show that births decrease at an 
increasing rate when income is at intermediate levels (between 
i wh  and 
i wh ), and then 
decrease at a decreasing rate at high levels of income (above 
i wh ).
15 This pattern is 




                                                 
13 Note that ρ   is constant from individual’s point of view, but it could vary across countries.  
14 For extensive discussion of family social services during both the former regimes and the transition 
period, see Milanovic (1998).  











16 Kremer (1993) assumes an almost identical pattern for population growth versus income. Jones (2000) 
supposes the same pattern to characterize the relationship between fertility and productivity. 
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     0 
      (x1+x2/R) 
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The model also permits a characterization of the relationship between the number 
of births and the distribution of labor income. Theorem 1 demonstrates that, for an 
economy with a significant fraction of the population with incomes below the Malthusian 
threshold 
______
i wh , rising inequality negatively impacts fertility. To derive this result, we use 
the notion of a mean preserving spread (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1970) in which one 
distribution is constructed from another by moving mass from the middle of the 
distribution to the tails, keeping the mean constant and increasing the variance.
17   Let µ  
be an appropriately defined measure defined over young adult agents.  Then we have  
 







0 µ µ ,   i.e., if there are a greater mass of low income than high 
income agents, then a simple mean preserving spread of the distribution of labor income 
decreases the aggregate number of births as long as the spread distribution also satisfies 
this inequality.
18 
                                                 
17 The assumption of constant mean is not crucial to the analysis. Assuming a decreasing mean (since labor 
income decreases during economic depressions) strengthens the result. 
18 Proof is provided in Appendix A.2. 
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The intuition for this result is straightforward: during an economic depression, the 
proportion of agents with income below the Malthusian threshold increases and children 
become less affordable. As long as there are not too many high income agents (i.e. non-
Malthusians), rising inequality produces a larger proportion of poor individuals who 
behave as Malthus predicted. Note that this theorem does not depend on the minimum 
number of births being b , but follows from the aggregation of fertilty choices with 
varying domination of income and substitution effects.  
 
 
4  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
The model produces three empirically testable predictions for fertility in times of 
economic depression.  First, declining labor income causes fertility to fall. Second, since 
the condition in Theorem 1 is likely to be satisfied for all post-transition countries, 
increases in income inequality also have contributed to fertility declines. Third, higher 
perceived levels of subsistence consumption have a negative impact on fertility rates. 
The first two predictions are tested using cross-section time-series data for 23 
transition countries from 1979 to 1999.
19 The third prediction is directly tested using 
microeconomic data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS).
20 
                                                 
19 This is the largest number of transition countries for which we have been able to assemble data on 
variables in the model. Out of 27 transition countries, four countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Yugoslavia) were excluded from our empirical analyses because of missing or unreliable 
data.  
20 The RLMS is supervised by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill. The first phase started in 1992 with around 6,300 households. The second phase started in 1994 with   MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 19 
 
Individual-level data avoids the endogeneity issues that plague the fertility-income 
association in aggregate data. Most importantly, this dataset allows us to directly test the 
impact of perceived levels of subsistence consumption on fertility choices. 
 
5.2  FERTILITY IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES: CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE 
 
We use both common measures of fertility in our studies, the crude birth rate 
(CBR) and the total fertility rate (TFR), as a robustness check. Wages – a factor that 
determines labor income – are proxied by real GDP per capita since, by equation (A3), 
they are directly proportional to each other. As in Barro (1991), school enrollment rates 
are used as proxies for human capital, the other factor that determines labor income in the 
model. In particular, we use gross secondary school enrollment rates measuring the 
number of students enrolled in the designated grade levels relative to the total population 
of the corresponding age group. Except in three transition countries (Hungary, Poland 
and Slovenia), secondary school enrollment plummeted after 1990, with the largest 
decline (more than 50 percent) recorded in Albania. The birth rate, real GDP per capita, 
and secondary school enrollment data are all taken from the World Bank (World 
Development Indicators, 2001).  
Income inequality is typically measured by the Gini coefficients in the       
Deininger-Squire dataset. However, this dataset does not contain full time-series data for 
most transition countries. A major improvement in measuring income inequality in the 
countries under study is the UNICEF/ICDC TransMONEE project on monitoring social 
                                                                                                                                                 
almost 4,000 households. The data has been collected a total of 9 times. For a detailed description of the 
RLMS dataset, see http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/rlms_home.html.   MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 20 
 
conditions and public policy in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union.
21 The measure of income inequality used in our analysis is taken from the 
TransMONEE data on Gini coefficients of monthly earnings that span from 1989 to 1997 
for 15 transition countries. 
Finally, the transition from communism to market economies was accompanied, 
in most countries, by a dramatic increase in democratization and political liberalization. 




Table 2.  Fertility: Transition Countries, 1979-99 
 (1)  (2)
1) (3)  (4)
1) 
Dependent variable  CBR  TFR 






































































         
Adjusted R
2 .84  .95  .76  .93 
Number of observations  183  74  172  74 
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. 
Coefficients for country dummies are not shown to conserve space. 
* = significant at 10 percent; 
** = significant at 5 percent; 
*** = significant at 1 percent. 
1) Data span from 1989-97 for 15 countries. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
21 See, http://eurochild.gla.ac.uk/Documents/monee. 
22 We use the "polity index" from the Polity IV dataset. Source: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity.   MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 21 
 
Table 2 reports the results of using the FGLS procedure with country fixed effects 
(Greene, 2000).
23 All independent variables are lagged one period to instrument the 
variables the theory identifies as jointly endogenous with births, as well as to capture 
dynamic changes in the underlying structure. To account for the nonlinear relationship 
between births and labor income shown in Figure 4, squares of the proxies for wages and 
human capital are included in the regressions.
24   
Regressions (1) and (3) test the quadratic relationship between fertility and labor 
income, controlling for increased democratization. The linear coefficients on real GDP 
per capita and secondary school enrollment carry the expected positive signs and are 
significant at better than 1%. Importantly, the significant negative coefficients on the 
squared terms capture the model’s prediction of a positive relationship between fertility 
and income which attenuates as income moves above the Malthusian threshold.  
Figure 5 illustrates the nonlinear effect of income on fertility using the estimated 
coefficients from regression (1).  It shows that the (average) Malthusian threshold for the 
countries in the sample is approximately $7,600 GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$). At 
this threshold, the maximal CBR is 14.85.
25 Note that in 1999 the average GDP per capita 
in constant 1995 US$ for the 23 transition countries was approximately $2,500 and the 
average CBR was 11.54.  Thus, per capita incomes will have to increase, on average, 
more than 200% before the transition countries exit the Malthusian fertility stage. To wit, 
even if the transition countries are able to grow at 5% per year (real per capita), the model 
                                                 
23 The F-test for the presence of fixed effects rejected the null hypothesis that the intercept parameters for 
all countries are equal. 
24 The relationship between fertility and income when income is less than 
i wh can be approximated by a 
quadratic function.  This is the domain relevant for our analysis. 
25 The maximal TFR at the threshold is 1.90.   MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 22 
 
predicts that the average country in our sample will remain in a Malthusian fertility 
regime for the next twenty years. 
 































Regressions (2) and (4) add the GINI variable measuring income inequality to the 
base equations. As predicted by Theorem 1, increasing inequality has a negative and 
significant impact on fertility. However, once the effects of income inequality have been 
controlled for, the coefficients on secondary school enrollment are no longer significant. 
This suggests that inequality and school enrollment may have the same source of 
variation. Nevertheless, the coefficient estimates on GDP per capita are consistently 
statistically significant and robustly impact fertility in each regression. 
Throughout regressions (1) to (4) the coefficient on the civil liberty control 
variables carry negative, though sometimes insignificant, sign. This finding is consistent 
with Feng, Kugler & Zak (2001) who show that civil liberties have a negative and 
significant impact on fertility in a panel of 109 countries from 1960-1990.    MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 23 
 
Taken as a whole, the empirical results support the first two predictions of the 
theory (a Malthusian threshold and the role of inequality).  Next, we turn to testing the 
third prediction, the direct role of perceived subsistence levels on fertility choices.   
 
5.2  FERTILITY AND HARDSHIP: MICROECONOMIC EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIA 
 
In this section we use the 1998/99 RLMS data as the basis for our empirical work 
rather than aggregated national data. This data set, which includes complete survey 
responses from approximately 8,700 individuals (of which almost 5,000 are women), 
provides information that can be used to estimate the effect of the perceived subsistence 
level on fertility choices directly. 
The dependent variable, fertility, is based on a question in the RLMS on 
willingness to have a (another) child for women between 18 and 50 years of age who 
appeared to be fertile and have less than two children.
26 The dependent variable takes the 
value of 1 if a woman wants to have (another) child and 0 otherwise. We develop a 
standard probit regression model in which fertility is a function of income and the 
perceived poverty minimum as a proxy for perceived subsistence consumption.
27 To 
account for economies of size within the household, both income and the perceived 
poverty level are calculated per equivalent adult using a single-parameter equivalence of 
0.5.
28 In addition, we augment equation (4) with a set of variables capturing expectations 
                                                 
26 The respondent’s ability to become pregnant is based on a positive responses to the question, “Do you 
have a menstrual cycle now?”, including women who gave a negative answer but whose menstrual cycle 
stopped because of current pregnancy.  
27 Appendix A.3 provides description and summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
28 We also estimated the model using household per capita income and the perceived per person poverty 
minimum (i.e. when the equivalence parameter is unity). The estimated coefficients on these variables 
remained significant and carried the predicted signs.   MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 24 
 
of future economic status and satisfaction with one’s life at the present. Finally, we 
control for a number of individual characteristics, including age, education, marital and 
employment status, and religiousness that may account for variations across individuals 
in income and perceived subsistence level of consumption in equation (4).  
 
Table 3.   Probit Regression Results for Russia 
Dependent variable: 1 if wants (another) child, 0 otherwise 






Income per equivalent adult 











 per equivalent adult squared 










Perceived poverty minimum per 

























   -.0044
*** 
(.0015) 
Education     .0026 
(.0212) 
Married     -.1645 
(.1162) 
Employed     .0103 
(.1280) 











       




McFadden  R-squared  .02 .05 .20 
Number of observations  744  632  625 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are presented with their corresponding QML (Huber/White) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
Three stars indicate significance at 1%, two at 5% and one star indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 3 presents results of three probit regressions estimating the augmented 
fertility equation (4). Regression (1) includes only income per equivalent adult, its 
square, and the perceived poverty level per equivalent adult. As predicted by the theory, 
fertility has a quadratic relationship with income, initially increasing, and then 
decreasing. Also, as expected, the higher the perceived poverty line the less likely that a 
woman will want to have a (another) child.  Indeed, the estimated coefficient on the 
perceived poverty level is not only statistically significant, but quantitatively important, 
being about 50% larger (in absolute value) than the estimated coefficient on income 
itself.   
Regression (2) adds an additional set of control variables measuring subjective 
evaluations of present and future economic conditions to regression (1). As expected, 
having positive prospects for the future has positive and significant effect on fertility. On 
the other hand, evaluating one’s present situation in positive light does not significantly 
influence the willingness of a woman to have a (another) child. The estimated 
coefficients on the income terms and perceived poverty level all retain their predicted 
signs and high levels of significance with the inclusion of these additional variables. 
In regression (3), we include several demographic variables that may influence 
fertility choices. The relationship between fertility and age of the woman is quadratic, 
with the willingness to have children increasing until age 23 (the average age of women 
at childbearing in 1998), and then decreasing. When age is included in the regression, 
however, the effect of the perceived poverty level is considerably reduced and only 
marginally significant. While education and employment status have the expected 
positive signs, these coefficients are statistically insignificant. Likewise, being married   MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 26 
 
does not have a statistically significant effect on the willingness to have children. A 
possible explanation for this is the inclusion in the analysis of relatively young women 
(starting at age 18) who may anticipate getting married later.
29 Finally, religiousness has 
insignificant effect on fertility which should not be surprising since most of the women 
interviewed were raised under the former communist regime that disallowed the practice 
of religion.
30 
Throughout regression (1) through (3) the coefficients on income per equivalent 
adult and income per equivalent adult squared are consistently significant and carry the 
expected signs. The point estimates in regression (3) indicate fertility and income are 
positively related (holding constant the other variables) when income per equivalent adult 
is less than Rs. 9,000. The mean income per equivalent adult for the 3,830 interviewed 
households is Rs. 838 (the median income per equivalent adult is only Rs. 570).
31 In fact, 
only 11 households in the sample have income per equivalent adult higher than Rs. 9,000. 
This suggests that the majority of Russian households are in the Malthusian fertility state 
where there is a positive relationship between income and fertility. It is important to note 




                                                 
29 However, when we performed the same analysis including only women between 23 and 50 years of age, 
the effect of marital status on fertility remained insignificant. 
30 Interestingly, there was no appreciable difference in the willingness of Muslim women to answer 
questions about abortion, pregnancy history and other sensitive sections of the survey. 
31 By running the regression with household per capita income and perceived per person poverty level as 
independent variables we get a Malthusian threshold of Rs. 4,200. The mean household per capita income 
for the 3,830 households is Rs. 526. 
32 We ran regressions including other control variables (fear of job loss, ability to purchase necessities, 
economic rank on a 9-step scale, etc.) and the coefficients on income per equivalent adult and income per 
equivalent adult squared always remained statistically significant and carried the expected signs. 
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6  CONCLUSION 
 
The inverse relationship between income and fertility is a well-established result 
in the economic literature. Standard models typically predict that income reductions 
should increase, not decrease, fertility. The transition of post-communist countries in 
Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union shows that this “standard” result 
does not always hold. We demonstrated that if a standard fertility model is modified to 
allow for perceived subsistence consumption, the model can generate income-to-fertility 
causality that is substantially similar to that observed in the data. 
The model predicts that a reduction in labor income below an identified 
Malthusian threshold reduces the desire to have children. Thus, in times of economic 
crises, fertility falls.  Thomas Malthus understood the effect of poverty on fertility, 
writing in 1798 that  
But as from the laws of our nature some check to population must exist, it 
is better that it should be checked from a foresight of the difficulties 
attending a family and the fear of dependent poverty than that it should be 
encouraged, only to be repressed afterwards by want and sickness.  
 
The theory additionally predicts that increases in income inequality and perceived 
subsistence consumption levels decrease the aggregate number of births. For a sample of 
23 transition countries, we find strong empirical support for these propositions.   MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 28 
 
Is taking into account perceived subsistence consumption an appealing 
explanation for drastic declines in fertility in times of economic disruption? It might be 
possible to explain this behavior in transition countries through some different factor or 
factors, without considering the effects of income or perceived subsistence consumption. 
Nevertheless, because the model provides such a good explanation of the data, it is 
unclear why one would want to abandon the explanatory power of per capita income and 
perceived subsistence for an alternative explanation.   




  This appendix defines a competitive equilibrium for the model, provides proofs, 
and presents description of variables used in the empirical analysis.  
 
A.1  FIRMS AND EQUILIBRIUM 
 
  We close the model by specifying the problem faced by firms and then defining a 
competitive equilibrium. In every period the economy produces a single homogenous 
good, using physical capital and efficiency units of labor in the production process. 
Assume that there are many firms operating in a competitive environment and that agents 
of all human capital types are necessary to produce output. Let Kt  be the aggregate 
physical capital, µ  be an appropriately defined measure over working agents, 
t
t t d N ∫
∞
≡





t t d h H µ is aggregate human 
capital, i.e., the quantity of efficiency units of labor employed in production at time t. 
  The profit maximization problem for a representative firm at time t is  
 
   t t t t t H K H w K r Y − −
, max         ( A 1 )  
 
where  rt  is the cost of financing capital investments and  t w  is the wage rate per 
efficiency unit of labor at time t. Let the production function be Cobb-Douglas 
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α α − =
1
t t t H K Y          ( A 2 )  
 
for α  ∈  (0, 1). Solving for the firm’s profit maximizing condition using (A1) and (A2), 
shows that the labor income paid to a type i agent is the marginal product of type i labor,  
   




t t h H K h w
α α α
− − = 1        ( A 3 )  
 






t t t H K r .         ( A 4 )  
 
There are three markets in this model: goods, labor (all types), and capital. The 
capital market clears when, for some value of  1 + t R , 
 







t t d a K µ         ( A 5 )  
 
where a
i* is given by (3).  The working population at time t+1 is aggregate births Bt at 
time t,  
 







t t t d b B N µ         ( A 6 )  
 
where b
i*  is  given  by  (4).           MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 31 
 
 A  competitive equilibrium for the model above is a set of prices {}
∞
= + 0 1 , t t t R w , such 
that given 
i)  initial conditions for the distribution of physical capital, 
0 0 0 0 > = ∫
∞
K d a
i µ , and human capital,  0 0 0 0 > = ∫
∞ ∞ H d h µ ;  
ii)  a law of motion for physical capital (A5);  





t x x 1 , 2 , 1 , + ;  
consumers maximize lifetime utility by solving (1), firms maximize profits by solving 
(A1), and prices clear all markets. 
 
A.2  PROOFS 
 
The proof of Theorem 1 follows Rothshild & Stiglitz (1970). Other proofs are omitted to 
save space, but are available from the authors upon request.  
 
Proof. [Theorem 1]  Let F be the nondegenerate distribution of labor income at a 
particular point in time for a given level of capital stock, K, and let G be a distribution 
derived from F via a simple mean preserving spread (MPS).  By Lemma 1, for incomes 
below the threshold 
______
i wh , the desired number of children increases monotonically in 
labor income wh
i, and is concave. Increasing the mass of agents with incomes less than 
______
i wh  reduces fertility, since, by Rothschild & Stiglitz (1970),  ∫ ∫ <
i i wh i wh i dG b dF b
0 0 .   MATHUSIAN FERTILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 32 
 
Similarly, increasing the mass of agents with incomes above 
______
i wh  raises fertility. 







0 µ µ , the concavity of b(wh
i) for labor incomes below 
______
i wh  dominates the increase in fertility for agents with incomes above 
______
i wh .  That is, the 
decrease in fertility by relatively poor agents after an MPS exceeds the increase in 
fertility by relatively wealthy agents ′ 
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A.3  VARIABLE DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable    Description/RLMS  Question        Mean   
Willingness to have  1 if the woman wants (another) child,            0.40   
   (another) child         0 otherwise               (0.49) 
 
Household income  Household income in rubles           1927.37  
               (3198) 
 
Household per capita  Household income divided by the number of household members    630.07 
      income                 (1048.6) 
 
Income per equivalent  Household income divided by the number of household members   1083.51 
   adult         raised to the power of 0.5             (1788.8) 
 
Perceived poverty    Perceived family poverty level divided by the number of household   438.49 
   minimum per        members raised  to the power of 0.5 / “What amount of money   (399.40) 
   equivalent adult      would signify that your family is below the poverty level?”    
    
Future expectations  (1 = will live much worse, … 5 = will live much better) / “Do you    2.51 
         think that in the next 12 months you and your family will live   (1.07) 
         better than today?”   
 
Current satisfaction  (1 = not at all satisfied, … 5 = fully satisfied) / “To what extent    2.13 
   with life       are you satisfied with your life in general at present time?”     (1.03) 
 
A g e            A g e  i n  y e a r s                3 1 . 6 3    
             ( 8 . 1 6 )  
 
Education   Years  of  education  completed        10.90 
             ( 2 . 6 6 )  
 
Married    1  if  married,  0  otherwise           0.61 
             ( 0 . 4 9 )  
 
Employed   1  if  employed,  0  otherwise           0.71 
             ( 0 . 4 6 )  
 
Religiousness    1 = atheist, … 5 = believer             3.77 
             ( 0 . 9 9 )  
 
Notes:  Standard deviations in parentheses.  
The sample includes responses from women between 18 and 50 years of age who appeared to be 
fertile and had less than two children. 
Source:  The 1998/99 round of the RLMS dataset 
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